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HYDROGEN PEROXDE: THE THIRD CIRCUIT COMES CLEAN
ABOUT THE RULE 23 CLASS ACTION
CERTIFICATION STANDARD
I.

INTRODUCTION

Your child's Barbie that might cause lead poisoning, your iPod with a
battery that might stop working, your prescription pain-reliever that might
cause a heart attack, the pet food that may make your dog sick, your
Toyota that may accelerate without warning, and the company that sponsored your bar exam preparation course are all subjects of class action
lawsuits.' Today, it is common for a consumer to receive notice in the
mail that, as a result of purchasing a defective product, the consumer may
2
be entitled to a small piece of a settlement from a class action lawsuit.
Class actions are "hot" with subjects ranging from product liability suits
3
against tobacco manufacturers to suits against airlines for flight delays. In
1. See Barnaby J. Feder, FederalPanel Consolidates Vioxx Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
17, 2005, at C1 (discussing consolidation of numerous class action lawsuits pending against drug manufacturer Merck for alleged deaths caused by drug Vioxx);
2009,
John Kell, Mattel Settles Suit Over Lead in China-Made Toys, WALL 7ST.J., 7Oct. 14,
7 44 735
2
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748 0410 2045
1425697710.html (discussing settlement of class action over lead in China-made
toys, including Barbie); Apple.com, Notice of Court Approval of Class Action Settlement Agreement, http://images.apple.com/ca/ipod/settlement/pdf/MTL
LAW-2134637-v1.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (describing terms of iPod battery
settlement); BAR/BRI Class Action Litigation, http://www.barbri-classaction.com/
barbri/default.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (discussing settlement of antitrust
class action litigation against BAR/BRI and Kaplan, two companies offering bar
review courses in various states); Jeremy Korzeniewski, Class Action Suit Filed Against
Toyota over Sudden Acceleration Claims, AUTOBLOc, Nov. 9, 2009, http://www.auto
blog.com/2009/11/09/class-action-suit-filed-against-toyota-over-sudden-acceleration (announcing filing of class action lawsuit against Toyota on behalf of all
Toyota and Lexus owners with vehicles that unintentionally accelerated); Lisa
Wade McCormick, Menu Foods Settles Pet Food Class Action, CONSUMERAFFIRs.COM,
Apr. 2, 2008, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2008/04/petjfood-recalls9l.html (noting Menu Pet Foods settled class action over pet food that allegedly made dogs and cats sick).
2. See J. Brendan Day, My Lawyer Went to Court and All I Got Was This Lousy
Coupon! The Class Action FairnessAct's Inadequate Provisionfor judicial Scrutiny over
Proposed Coupon Settlements, 38 SETON HALL L. REv. 1085, 1085 (2008) (discussing
class action settlement notice that consumers received in mail regarding Firestone
tires); AcmeTech.com, Netflix Class Action Suit Settlement, http://www.acmetech.
com/shopping/movies/neflix-class-action-suit.php (discussing Nefflix class action
settlement) (last visited Oct. 15, 2010); Saturn Owners Class Action Settlement,
JUSTGOODCARS.COM (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.justgoodcars.com/car-news-world
wide/auto-news-1940.html (discussing class action settlement that entitled Saturn

automobile owners to reimbursement for expenses incurred for replacement or
repair of transmissions).

3. See Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class
Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Court of Appeals Under
Rule 23(t), 41 Wm. &

MARY

L. REv. 1531, 1532 (2000) (discussing recent scholarly

(985)
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a post-Enron world, with the Obama Administration's commitment to enforcing antitrust laws to ensure fair competition within the American
economy, class actions against corporations will become a staple of the
American judicial system.4
A class action is "a lawsuit in which the court authorizes a single person or a small group of people to represent the interests of a larger
group."5 Class actions have two primary purposes: "(1) to accomplish judicial economy by avoiding multiple suits; and (2) to protect the rights of
persons who might not be able to present claims on an individual basis."6
To this end, these actions provide an avenue of recovery for groups of
plaintiffs who otherwise would likely go uncompensated. 7
A court's decision on a certification motion is a pivotal moment in
class action litigation. 8 Indeed, a decision to certify a class typically leads
to settlement of the case. 9 Eighty-nine percent of certified class actions
interest in class actions covering variety of topics). Although recently gaining popularity, class actions have played an important role in American litigation for decades. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486-87 (1954) (indicating
that this seminal case, which led to desegregation of American schools, was initially
brought as class action lawsuit).
4. See generally T. Mark McLaughlin et al., United States, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST
LTlGATION 2010, at 146 (2009), available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=8276&nid=6 (declaring "[p]rivate antitrust litigation in the
United States continues to be robust" and discussing focus on antitrust litigation
within today's political climate).
5. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 267 (8th ed. 2004).
6. Haley v. Medtronic, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 643, 647 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
7. See generally Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997)
(opining that without aggregation of parties in class action lawsuits, small recoveries inhibit most individuals from filing suit); Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys.,
Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (noting that "class actions may represent
the only available means of redress for consumers whose claims are too small individually to render legal action economically feasible"); Arthur Oder, Note, What's
Fairis Fair? A ComparativeLook at JudicialDiscretionin FairnessReview of HolocaustEra
Class Action Settlement in the United States and Canada, 17 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 545, 547 (2009) (theorizing that without victories in class action lawsuits "Holocaust survivor community would forever lose its chance for recovery").
8. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154,
167 (3d Cir. 2001) (observing that "irrespective of the merits, certification decisions may have a decisive effect on litigation"); Barry Sullivan & Amy Kobelski
Trueblood, Rule 2 3(): A Note on Law and Discretion in the Courts of AppeaLs, 246
F.R.D. 277, 278 (2008) ("Arguably the most critical stage in a class action is the
point at which the court decides whether to certify the class."); see also Kevin Burke
& Charles Manice, Certifiably Mad? Evolving Standardsfor Class Certification in Securities FraudActions, THE DEFENDER (Howrey LLP, New York, N.Y.), Spring 2009, available at http://thedefender.howrey.com/certifiably-mad-06-09-2009 (stating that
"[c]lass certification increasingly has become a hotly contested issue in actions arising under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934").
9. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir.
2008) (recognizing that decision to certify class can "create unwarranted pressure
to settle non-meritorious claims"); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,
1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that based on enormous liability that could result
from adverse judgment in class action lawsuit, defendants "may not wish to roll
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settle.' 0 Due to the likelihood of settlement of a certified class action,
regardless of the claim's merits, one court called settlement after class certification a form of 'judicial blackmail.""1 Conversely, denial of a class
certification motion often sounds the "death knell" of litigation for the
plaintiffs and means that individual lawsuits are unlikely to remain viable. 12 Because certification often determines the fate of a case, defining
the contours of class action certification standards is an important task for
13
federal circuit courts across the country.
[the] dice" and therefore "will be under intense pressure to settle"); FED. R. Crv. P.
23 advisory committee's note to the 1998 amendments (emphasizing class certification "may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending the
class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability"); Steven Serajeddini,
Note, Loss Causation and Class Certification, 108 MICH. L. REv. 255, 256-57 (2009)
(noting that successful class certification "impel[s] defendants to settle" securities
fraud class actions); Adele Nicholas, Appeals Court Levels Class Action PlayingField,
INSIDE COUNs., Apr. 4, 2009, available at http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/
2009/April-2009/Pages/Appeals-Court-Levels-.aspx (calling defense of class action
post-class certification like playing game of financial Russian Roulette). The Supreme Court recently warned that class action litigation discovery costs can be so
high as to force a defendant to settle an unmeritorious claim. See Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007) (discussing enormous expense involved in antitrust discovery after class certification).
10. See Gail E. Lees et al., Analysis & Perspective: 2009: First-QuarterUpdate on
Class Action Trends, 10 CLAss ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) 399, 401 (2009); see generally
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action FairnessAct in Perspective: The Old and New in
FederalJurisdictionalReform, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1823, 1853 n.104 (2008) (stating that
certified class actions are "two to five more times likely to settle than uncertified
cases that contained class allegations").
11. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (discussing enormous pressure on defendants to settle any class action claim due to extreme risk defendants face if they lose at trial).
12. See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 310 (citation omitted) (acknowledging
that denial of certification may end lawsuit for potential plaintiffs); Serajeddini,
supra note 9, at 256-57 (noting failure to certify class usually means "plaintiffs will
drop the claim"). The "death knell doctrine" was an initial impetus for allowing
interlocutory appeal of class certification decisions. See Alan J. Howard & Cary I.
Klafter, Applicability ofa Class Action Dismissal: The "DeathKnell" Doctrine, 39 U. CHI.
L. REv. 403, 411-17 (1972) (discussing origin and meaning of "death knell doctrine" in class action lawsuits).
13. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Year-End Update on Class Actions: Explosive Growth in Class Actions Continues Despite Mounting Obstacles to Certification (Feb.
10, 2009), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/Year-EndUpdateOn
ClassActions.aspx (discussing rising prominence of class action lawsuits in federal
courts during 2008). The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) opened up the
door to federal courts for diversity jurisdiction class actions, leading to an increase
in the number of class action lawsuits filed in federal courts. See generally EMERY G.
LEE ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPACT OF THE CLAs ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON THE
FEDERAL COURTS 1 (2008), availableat http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
cafall08.pdf/$file/cafall08.pdf (finding that "number of class actions based on
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction filed in or removed to the federal courts increased after CAFA's effective date"); Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA's Stated
jurisdictionalPolicy, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1765, 1788-1808 (2008) (discussing CAFA
and trend towards litigation of class actions in federal instead of state courts).
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With its recent decision in In re Hydrogen PeroxideAntitrust Litigation,'4
the Third Circuit promulgated strict guidelines that district courts must
follow when reviewing class action certification motions.15 This Casebrief
examines how the Third Circuit's opinion redefined the evolving "rigorous analysis" required for determination of class certification motions and
leveled the playing field for defendants opposing class certification.' 6 Part
II of this Casebrief summarizes the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 23), which governs class certification, and
describes Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area.1 7 Further, Part II explores various federal courts' interpretations of Rule 23.18 Part III analyzes the Third Circuit's reasoning in Hydrogen Peroxide, detailing the indepth process that a district court must follow when deciding motions for
class certification. 19 Part IV illuminates the new challenges and concerns
facing plaintiffs seeking class certification and discusses new strategies for
defendants opposing class certification. 20 Finally, Part V assesses Hydrogen
Peroxide's impact on class action certification within the Third Circuit and
on other federal courts. 2 1
14. 552 F.3d 305, 309 (3d Cir. 2008).
15. See id. at 307 (clarifying class certification standards).
16. See infra notes 98-116 and accompanying text (discussing new burdens for
plaintiffs seeking class certification in light of Third Circuit's rigorous review standard). According to the Supreme Court, a class action should be "certified if the
trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)
have been satisfied." Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). The
Third Circuit's opinion represents "an important reversal of the trend in the Third
Circuit that favored plaintiffs seeking class certification." See Third Circuit Levels
PlayingFieldfor Defendants Opposing Class Certification, DECHERT ON PoIr (Dechert
LLP), Jan. 2009, availableat http://www.dechert.com/library/Antitrust_31 01-09
ThirdCircuitLevelsPlayingField.pdf. Prior to Hydrogen Peroxide, defendants in
the Third Circuit faced an uphill battle in efforts to defeat class certification motions. See Nicholas, supra note 9 (explaining that before this decision, "corporate
defendants start[ed] the class certification stage of an antitrust case at a disadvantage" because "the standard for getting a class certified [was] low"); Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher LLP, supra note 13 (noting that district court "imposed a relatively
light burden on plaintiffs" at class certification stage in compliance with previous
Third Circuit precedent); see also In re Indus. Diamonds Antitrust Litig., 167 F.R.D.
374, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that "because of the important role that class
actions play in the private enforcement of antitrust statutes, courts resolve doubts
about whether a class should be created in favor of certification").
17. See infra notes 33-54 and accompanying text (discussing adjudication of
Rule 23 in Supreme Court and federal courts' interpretations of Rule 23
requirements).
18. See infra notes 55-67 and accompanying text (summarizing Third Circuit
jurisprudence with respect to Rule 23 class certification before Hydrogen Peroxide
decision).
19. See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit guidance to lower courts regarding requirements of Rule 23).
20. See infra notes 92-116 and accompanying text (suggesting new litigation
strategies for plaintiffs and defendants in light of Third Circuit's ruling).
21. See infra notes 117-124 and accompanying text (identifying importance of
Hydrogen Peroxide opinion).
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BACKGROUND

Rule 23 and Class Certification Requirements

Rule 23 governs class certification within federal courts. 2 2 Rule 23(a)
requires the party moving to certify a class to demonstrate that the proposed class meets the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality,
and adequacy of representation.2 3 Once the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)
are satisfied, the party seeking class certification must demonstrate that
the proposed class is of one of the three types enumerated in Rule
23(b). 2 4 Antitrust class actions, as well as most class actions seeking monetary damages, are typically brought under Rule 23(b) (3)'s "predominance
and superiority path."2 5 Under this "path," plaintiffs must demonstrate
that "questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating
the controversy."2 6
The issue of predominance decides the fate of many class certification
motions and is hotly contested at the certification stage.2 7 The Supreme
Court stated that a class should be certified only after the district court
22. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (stating prerequisites for filing class action). State
courts generally have modeled their state procedural rules governing class actions
after Rule 23. See, e.g., DE. SUPER CT. R. Civ. P. 23 (listing requirements for class
action certification in Delaware); N.J.R. CT. 4:32-2 (providing requirements for
class certification within New Jersey state courts); PA. R. Civ. P. 707 (governing
motions for certification of class action in Pennsylvania state courts).
23. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). A class can be certified only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims
of defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Id.
24. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (listing three types of class action lawsuits).
25. See Linda P. Nussbaum & John D. Radice, The Evolving Challenges of Class
Certification 4 (Dec. 8, 2009) (on file with author) (noting "Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance and superiority path is the most common route to certification of actions seeking damages"); see alsoJay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy ofRepresentation,
87 TEX. L. REv. 1137, 1167 (2009) (stating "plaintiffs with injunctive claims will use
Rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2)" instead of 23(b)(3)). Plaintiffs often seek to avoid
having to pursue certification under Rule 23(b) (3) because the predominance
and superiority requirements are costly and difficult to prove. See Andrew Bradt,
"Much to Gain and Nothing to Lose" Implications of the History of the DeclaratoryJudgment
for the (b)(2) Class Action, 58 ARK. L. REv. 767, 795-96 (2006) (discussing additional
barriers facing Rule 23(b) (3) class at certification stage).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3).
27. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 594 (1997) (holding predominance requirement not met in asbestos case); Desai v. Deutsche Bank
Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that case involving questions of predominance in securities fraud claim did not move beyond certification
stage for seven years).
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conducts "a rigorous analysis" of the Rule 23 requirements.2 8 With the
promulgation of Rule 23(f) in 1998, parties gained the ability to appeal a
class certification decision before proceeding with the rest of a trial, which
permitted appellate review of a district court's decision to grant or deny
certification.29 Although appellate courts retain broad discretion in determining whether to grant review of a class certification decision, the drafters of Rule 23 emphasized that an interlocutory appeal should be granted
when "the certification decision turns on a novel or unsettled question of
law, or when, as a practical matter the decision on certification is likely
dispositive of the litigation."3 0 When reviewing a district court's decision
on class certification, a court of appeals applies an abuse of discretion standard.3 ' Although the abuse of discretion standard accords deference to
the trial court, unclear class certification standards have caused federal
appellate courts to routinely find that district courts abused their discretion in granting class certification.3 2
B.

Unclear Certification StandardsEmerge Within the Circuits
from Muddy Supreme Court Guidance

In the past, federal courts have struggled to reconcile confusing Supreme Court guidance on certification standards.33 Federal courts have
28. See Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) (opining that
without "rigorous analysis" court cannot properly define parameters of class).
29. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note to the 1998 amendments (granting courts of appeals "unfettered discretion whether to permit [an]
appeal" regarding class certification); William Kolasky & Kevin Stemp, Antitrust
Class Actions: More Rigor, Fewer Shortcuts, CLAss AcriON REP., Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 2,
available at http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/Publication/da664923-f9dd-4b75-bd
le-f43f8806d246/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/140b9324-0138-4fOa-b8f4f9 dl08elcel5/KolaskyAuthorArticle.pdf (discussing how 1998 amendments allowed courts "to take a more active role in developing more consistent and coherent standards for class action certification"). Prior to 1998, class certification
decisions could not be appealed until there was a judgment on the merits of the
case. See Howard & Klafter, supra note 12, at 407-11 (discussing problems with lack
of ability to appeal class certification decisions and noting judge-made exceptions
to this rule that existed prior to 1998); see also Carey M. Erhard, A Discussion of the
Interlocutory Review of Class Certification Orders Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(f), 51 DIRKE L. REv. 151 (2002) (discussing ability to appeal class certification
decisions prior to and after enactment of Rule 23(f)).
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note. See also Gutierrez v. Johnson &Johnson, 523 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that "Rule 23(f)'s window
of review is deliberately small").
31. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir.
2008) (noting abuse of discretion "occurs if the district court's decision rests upon
a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper
application of law to fact" (internal quotations and citation omitted)).
32. See Kolasky & Stemp, supra note 29 (stating "sixty-six percent of [class certification] grants" were reversed from 1998 through 2008).
33. See Ian Simmons, Alexander P. Okuliar & Nilam A. Sanghvi, Without Presumptions: Rigorous Analysis in Class CertificationProceedings, 21 ANrfTRUsT 3 (2007),
available at http://www.omm.com/files/upload/Rigorousanalysis.pdf (discussing
divergent directives from Supreme Court regarding Rule 23 standards).
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difficulty conducting a "rigorous analysis of certification elements without
34
engaging in a preliminary inquiry about . . . the merits of the case."
Courts traditionally have taken "a quick look" at the plaintiffs certification
motion, but have avoided conducting a searching inquiry into the plain35
tiff's evidence and factual allegations offered in support of the motion.
Recently, however, federal courts have started to engage in a more searching analysis at the certification stage. 36
1.

Liberal Certification Controls Under Eisen

Although Rule 23 provides standards for class certification and denotes that the party seeking class certification bears the burden of proof,
the Rule itself does not provide guidance as to what showing is required to
meet that burden.3 7 In a 1974 case, Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin,3 8 the Supreme Court established that the merits of a case should not be considered when deciding a class certification motion.3 9 Some lower courts
interpreted this ruling as a broad bar against weighing any evidence that
dealt with the merits of a claim. 40 Additionally, courts interpreted Eisen as
a command to take all allegations contained in a plaintiffs complaint as
true.41 Finally, following Eisen, courts "resisted being drawn into a 'battle
34. See id. (noting that confusion prompted many federal courts to merely
engage in "superficial" review of facts determining class certification).
35. See Nussbaum & Radice, supra note 25 (determining traditional analysis is
"in accord" with local procedural rules that encourage plaintiffs to seek class certification early in litigation process).
36. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 29-31 (2d Cir. 2006)
(summarizing cases from various circuits where courts engaged in probing inquiry
at certification stage).
37. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316 (3d Cir.
2008) (concluding that "little guidance is available on the proper standard of
'proof' for class certification"). The burden of proof for class certification motions
lies with the party seeking certification. See Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316,
320 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that "party seeking certification bears the burden of
establishing that all requirements of Rule 23 have been satisfied").
38. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
39. See id. at 177 ("[N]othing in either the language or history of Rule 23 ...
gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a
suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.").
40. See, e.g., Caridad v. Metro N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 291 (2d Cir.
1999) (quoting Eisen and opining that "a motion for class certification is not an
occasion for examination of the merits of the case"); Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied
Maint. Corp., 574 F.2d 656, 661 n.15 (2d Cir. 1978) (emphasizing that district
court judge "was prohibited from conducting an inquiry into the merits by the
Supreme Court's decision" in Eisen); In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 826 F. Supp.
1019, 1033 (N.D. Miss. 1993) (declaring that "the court does not delve into the
merits of plaintiffs' substantive claims"); Steinmetz v. Bache & Co., 71 F.R.D. 202,
204 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding that "on this motion for class action determination,
inquiry into the merits of plaintiffs' claim is foreclosed").
41. See Shelter, 574 F.2d at 661 n.15 (emphasizing that "it is proper to accept
complaint allegations as true"); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901, n.17 (9th
Cir. 1975) (noting that "[t]he court is bound to take the substantive allegations of
the complaint as true"); Catfish, 826 F. Supp. at 1033 (explaining that "in ruling
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of the experts' on the theory that only the trier of fact could determine
what weight to give the experts' conclusions." 42
2.

More Rigorous Review of Class Certification Under Falcon

Just eight years after the Eisen decision, the Supreme Court again
spoke on class certification standards in General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,43 an employment discrimination class action suit brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.44 In Falcon, the Supreme
Court noted- without addressing Eisen-that "sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on
the certification question."45 Further, the Supreme Court emphasized
that a class may be certified only "if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of [R]ule 23(a) are satisfied." 46 Many
federal courts interpreted Falcon as allowing a preliminary inquiry into the
merits of a case at the certification stage.4 7 Additionally, various circuits
upon class certification motion, the substantive allegations contained in plaintiffs'
complaint are accepted as true"); Mayo v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 148 F.R.D. 576,
579 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (indicating that "for purpose of a class certification motion,
a court must accept as true the allegations contained in the complaint"); Hardin v.
Harshbarger, 814 F. Supp. 703, 706 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (stating that "[i]n evaluating
the motion for class certification, the allegations in support of certification are
taken as true").
42. Kolasky & Stemp, supra note 29.
43. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
44. See id. (discussing facts giving rise to class action lawsuit). Although Falcon
was the next major Supreme Court case related to class action certification standards, in 1978 the Court did make passing mention of certification standards in a
securities fraud case. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.12
(1978) ("Evaluation of many of the questions entering into determination of class
[certification standards] . .. is intimately involved with the merits of the claim."
(quoting 15 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 485
n.45 (1976))).
45. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160.
46. See id. at 161 (citing concerns about potential unfairness to potential class
members bound by class certification judgments as support for requirement of
substantial analysis at certification stage). Although the Supreme Court explicitly
stated that the rigorous analysis applies to Rule 2 3 (a) requirements, courts have
interpreted this statement as applying with equal force to the requirements of Rule
23(b). See In re Initial Pub. Offering Secs. Litig., 471 F.2d 24, 33 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006)
(stating there is "no reason to doubt that what the Supreme Court said about Rule
23(a) requirements applies with equal force to all Rule 23 requirements, including
those set forth in [R]ule 23(b)(3)").
47. See, e.g., Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d
261, 266 (5th Cir. 2007) ("A district court still must give full and independent
weight to each Rule 23 requirement, regardless of whether that requirement overlaps with the merits."); Initial Pub. Offering Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d at 32 (noting that
"[s]ome overlap with the ultimate review on the merits is an acceptable collateral
consequence that courts must perform when determining whether Rule 23's requirements have been met . . . ."); Gariety v. Grant Thorton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356,
366 (4th Cir. 2004) (emphasizing that "while an evaluation of the merits . .. is not
part of a Rule 23 analysis, the factors spelled out in Rule 23 must be addressed
through findings even if they overlap with the issues on the merits"); Szabo v.
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subsequently determined that plaintiffs' allegations should not necessarily
48
Circuits also conbe accepted as true at the class certification stage.
cluded that some inquiry into the weight of expert testimony should be
49
conducted.
3.

An Emerging New Standard?

In 1997, the Supreme Court once again discussed the requirements of
Rule 23 in affirming decertification of a class of plaintiffs in Amchem Products v. Windsor.5 0 In Amchem, the Supreme Court instructed lower courts
to take a "close look" to determine whether plaintiffs had met Rule
5
23(b) (3)'s predominance and superiority requirements. '
In 2003, the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with Chief Judge Anthony Scirica, author of the Hydrogen Peroxide
opinion, as a member, amended the standard in Rule 23 for the timing of
ruling on class certification from "as soon as practicable" to "at an early
practicable time." 52 Revised Rule 23, in conjunction with the Supreme
Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2001) (observing that "nothing in . .. Rule 23 ... prevents the district court from looking beneath the surface
of the complaint"); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 298 (1st
Cir. 2000) (reasoning that some inquiry into merits is necessary "in order to determine whether common or individual issues predominate in a given case"); Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 677 n.12 (10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that "merits
may become intertwined with proper consideration of other issues germane to
whether the case should be certified as a class action").
48. See Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding, in
securities fraud class actions where plaintiff pleads reliance based on efficient market hypothesis, court "may not simply presume the facts in favor of an efficient
market"); Gariety, 368 F.3d at 359 (opining that reliance on "mere assertions" by
plaintiffs is insufficient for required "rigorous analysis" of Rule 23); Tardiff v. Knox
County, 365 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that "it is sometimes taken for
granted that the complaint's allegations are necessarily controlling, but class action machinery is expensive and ... the court has the power to test disputed premises early on . . . ."); Szabo, 249 F.3d at 675 ("The proposition that a district judge
must accept all of the complaint's allegations when deciding whether to certify a
class cannot be found in Rule 23 and has nothing to recommend it.").
49. See, e.g., Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 575 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting
at certification stage court may need to solve "expert disputes concerning the im); West v. Prudential Secs.,
port of evidence concerning the factual setting ....
Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding "a district judge may not duck
hard questions by observing each side has some support" and emphasizing that
judge may need to resolve disputes between competing experts at certification
stage).
50. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 629 (1997) (affirming
Third Circuit's decision to decertify class certified by district court because class
failed to meet Rule 23(b) (3) requirements).
51. See id. at 615-17 (reflecting on policies behind class action mechanism).
52. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, CLAssAcrION
http://www.classactionlitigation.com/rule23ProposedAmendLITIGATION.coM,
ments.pdf (illustrating changes made to Rule 23 via 2003 amendments). The Advisory Committee comments to the Rule 23 revisions in 2003 also compelled courts
to consider conducting a more searching inquiry into the merits at certification
stage. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c) (1) (A) advisory committee's note to the 2003
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Court's instruction to take a "close look" at allegations during certification, prompted many circuits to seriously examine the merits of claims at
the certification stage.5 3 For instance, in light of the amendments to Rule
23, the Second Circuit changed course and rejected the reasoning of its
earlier cases, which had allowed minimal standards of proof for Rule 23
elements, and refused to examine expert opinions at the class certification
stage.5 4
C.

The Third Circuit's Approach Before Hydrogen Peroxide

Prior to Hydrogen Peroxide, plaintiffs and attorneys "generally viewed
[the Third Circuit] as one of the most plaintiff-friendly circuits in the
country for antitrust class actions."5 5 The Third Circuit explicitly held
that Eisen did not prohibit an inquiry into the merits of a case at the certification stage. 5 6 The Third Circuit also stated that in class certification motions, plaintiffs' complaints are not deemed as uncontroverted truth, and
defendants can present evidence to undermine plaintiffs' claims.5 7 Nevertheless, courts within the Third Circuit have been reluctant to conduct a
searching inquiry into plaintiffs' allegations at the certification stage, erring on the side of allowing certification.5 8 Specifically, the Third Circuit
amendments ("[I]t is appropriate to conduct controlled discovery into the 'merits', limited to those aspects relevant to making a certification decision on an informed basis.").
53. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir.
2006) (listing new standards for district courts in light of more in-depth analysis of
merits at certification stage); In re PolyMedica Corp. Secs. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 5-6
(1st Cir. 2005) (citing cases in which circuit courts encouraged examination of
merits of case and pleadings at certification stage).
54. See Initial Pub. Offerings, 471 F.3d at 39-40 (stating that "obviously [the
court] can no longer continue to advise district courts that 'some showing' of
meeting Rule 23 requirements will suffice and that 'findings' are required, or that
an expert's report will sustain a plaintiffs burden so long as it is not 'fatally
flawed' ") (citations omitted).
55. Kolasky & Stemp, supra note 29. One of the reasons the Third Circuit was
viewed as plaintiff-friendly was because Third Circuit courts would allow class certification to be granted on a tentative basis, even if it was unclear that the plaintiffs
could meet the Rule 23 requirements. See generally In re School Asbestos Litig., 789
F.2d 996, 1011 (3d Cir. 1986) (granting district court wide discretion to grant certification and potentially decertify class later if plaintiffs did not demonstrate that
Rule 23 requirements were met).
56. See Newton v. Merill Lynch, Peirce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154,
167-69 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that Supreme Court's decision in Falcon demonstrated Court moving away from merits-prohibition in Eisen and further emphasizing that "[s]ince Eisen was decided, the nature of class actions and how they are
litigated have undergone a sea change").
57. SeeJohnston v. HBO Film Mgmt., 265 F.3d 178, 186 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that complaint allegations do not need to be presumed as true where "allegations are unsupported, and in some instances, rebutted, by a well-developed
record").
58. See Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 1970) (opining that
"the interests ofjustice require that in a doubtful case ... any error . .. should be
committed in favor of allowing the class action").
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recognized that private enforcement of antitrust laws is essential, and mandated district courts in antitrust litigation to grant class certification when
59
in doubt.
In certain antitrust cases, the Third Circuit allowed plaintiffs to enjoy
60
In Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.,61 a
a presumption of class-wide impact.

1977 antitrust case, the Third Circuit stipulated that a price-fixing conspiracy in antitrust actions could be presumed to have a market-wide effect,
satisfying the plaintiffs requirement of demonstrating class-wide impact
under Rule 23.62 This presumption of economic impact in price-fixing
cases is known as the "Bogosian short-cut" and is applied in the Third Cir63
cuit and in various other circuits.
Relying on the Third Circuit's opinion in In re LinerboardAntitrust Litigation,64 district courts within the Third Circuit refused to consider oppos65
In Linerboard, the court
ing expert testimony at the certification stage.
explained that plaintiffs do not enjoy a strict presumption of impact when
66
Nonetheless, as long as plaintiffs
there is an allegation of price-fixing.
offer an expert opinion to support the impact claim, they benefit from a
59. See Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 120 F.R.D. 642, 645
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (recognizing that "private enforcement of antitrust laws is a necessary supplement to government action," and thus concluding "when a court is in
doubt as to whether or not to certify a class action, the court should err in favor of
allowing the class"). Similar reasoning underlies the favoring of class certification
in securities class actions. See Kahan, 424 F.2d at 169 (discussing policy reasons
favoring class certification in securities fraud class actions).
60. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 449-50 (3d Cir. 1977) (allowing presumption of impact in cases involving alleged horizontal price-fixing).
61. 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977).
62. See id. at 455 (stipulating that once plaintiffs established that there was
nationwide conspiracy to raise prices, economic injury to all potential class members could be presumed).
63. See, e.g., In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d 145, 152 (3d Cir. 2002)
(applying Bogosian shortcut); In re Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litig., 232 F.R.D. 346,
352 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (same); In re Carbon Black Antitrust Litig., No. Civ.A.0310191-DPW, 2005 WL 102966 at *15 & n.16 (D. Mass. Jan. 18, 2005) (same); In re
Mercedez-Benz Antitrust Litig., 213 F.R.D. 180, 188 (D.NJ. 2003) (same); In re
Wirebound Boxes Antitrust Litig., 128 F.R.D. 268, 373 (D. Minn. 1989) (same); In
re Alcoholic Beverages Litig., 95 F.R.D. 321, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (same).
64. 305 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 2002).
65. See Steven Bizar, Thomas P. Manning & Landon Y. Jones, Bogosian,
2009, available at http://
Linerboard After Hydrogen Peroxide, LAw 360, Feb.2210,
89
.pdf (noting that "district
www.buchananingersoll.com/media/pnc/9/media.
courts following Linerboard .. . rarely considered in depth the opinions of defense
experts opposing class certification and made no effort to resolve factual disputes
presented by conflicting expert opinions"). This was the approach the district
court followed in Hydrogen Peroxide. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig.,
240 F.R.D. 163, 171 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (stating that factual disputes about expert
testimony are questions for jury), vacated, 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008).
66. See Linerboard,305 F.3d at 155 (refusing to allow direct presumption of
impact without some evidence to support plaintiffs' claims).
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presumption that they satisfy the Rule 23 burden, regardless of the quality
of the expert testimony.6 7
III.

BLEACHING CLEAN THE MUDDY WATERS OF

CLASS

CERTIFICATION

STANDARDS: THE THIRD CIRCUIT SPEAKS
IN HYDROGEN PEROXIDE

Recognizing the lack of clarity in the application of Rule 23 requirements, the Third Circuit promulgated explicit guidelines for district
courts to use when deciding class certification motions.6 8 In an opinion
by ChiefJudge Scirica, the court addressed three major issues concerning
class certification standards under Rule 23: (1) the appropriate standard
of proof for class certification; (2) whether factual and legal questions
touching on the merits of the case need to be resolved at the certification
stage; and (3) whether district courts should consider opposing expert testimony to discredit the testimony of a plaintiffs expert witness.6 9
A.

The District Court Skips to the Rinse Cycle

In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a group of direct purchasers
of hydrogen peroxide moved to certify a class action lawsuit against various chemical manufacturers alleging that the manufacturers committed
an antitrust violation by engaging in a price-fixing conspiracy. 70 The defendants did not contest that the plaintiffs met the requirements for class
certification under Rule 23(a), but instead focused their argument on the
plaintiffs' failure to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)-specifically
whether "questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members."7 1
67. See id. (noting that plaintiffs offered expert testimony to support application of Bogosian presumption). This is often referenced as the "belt-and-suspenders" framework to proving impact-the belt being that all plaintiffs were impacted
by price fixing conspiracy with the suspenders being an expert opinion "supported
by charts and studies." See Bizar et al., supra note 65 (discussing belt-and-suspenders approach in Third Circuit).
68. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316 (3d Cir.
2008) (observing that "little guidance is available on the subject of the proper
standard of 'proof' for class certification").
69. See id. at 307 (stating that "in this appeal [the court] clarif[ies] three key
aspects of certification procedure"). Commentators opine that the court also resolved if there was a presumption of impact in antitrust cases. See Paula Render &
Andrea Renaldi, Bogosian's Legacy Uncertain in Wake of Recent Third Circuit Decision
in Hydrogen Peroxide, ABA ATITRUST NEWSLETTER, Mar. 2009, availableat http://
wwwjonesday.com/files/Publication/d3e34c9d-97bb-4f 1-8264-c59fdb3l60bf/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c3ca3982-6lf7-45bf-909e-97fl bfb63be0/
Bogosian.pdf (discussing impact of Third Circuit's decision on Bogosian short-cut
presumption for antitrust class actions).
70. See Hydrogen Peroxide, 240 F.R.D. at 167-68 (discussing historical background of events giving rise to lawsuit).
71. See id. at 169-72 (stating that although defendants did not contest elements of Rule 23(a), court would briefly address these elements).
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In its Rule 23(b) analysis, the district court defined the limits of in72
Although
quiry into the merits of the case at the class certification stage.
certifiat
the
proper
was
it determined that "some inquiry" into the merits
cation stage, the court noted that, under Third Circuit precedent, it was
73
Thus, the
obliged to "limit that inquiry to the minimum necessary."
court refused to weigh disparities between the plaintiffs' and defendants'
claims to determine if the plaintiffs' evidence was "more or less credible
74

than defendants'."

Next, the court determined that class-wide impact could be presumed
in this case under the "Bogosian short-cut," which held that if plaintiffs
allege a price-fixing conspiracy, a presumption is created that each plain75
Moreotiff had purchased the product at the artificially increased price.
ver, the court rejected the defendants' contention that in order to certify a
class the plaintiffs must prove that each member was in fact injured by the
76
Finally, the court refused to address the defendants'
antitrust violation.
motion to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert regarding eco77
The court emphasized that it was "not pernomic impact and damages.
mitted . . . to weigh the relative credibility of the parties' experts" at the
78
certification stage.
After certification, the defendants filed a petition for interlocutory
appeal of the certification decision under Rule 23(f); the Third Circuit
72. See id. at 169-70 (noting that conflicting Supreme Court decisions in this
area are difficult to reconcile).
73. See id. at 170.
74. See id. (opining that at certification stage plaintiffs merely needed to show
that their attempt "to prove their allegations will involve common issues of fact and
law").
75. See id. at 173 (citing In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 203 F.R.D. 197, 217
(E.D. Pa. 2001)) (applying Bogosian presumption of impact in price-fixing case).
Other courts in the Third Circuit have also applied the Bogosian short-cut. See, e.g.,
Lumco Indus. v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 171 F.R.D. 168, 173 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (applying
presumption).
76. See Hydrogen Peroxide, 240 F.R.D. at 174 n.14 (noting that injury-in-fact
must be proven, but not at certification stage; rather, at certification stage "all
[plaintiffs] need demonstrate . . . is that antitrust impact on each member is susceptible to proof by predominantly common evidence").
77. See id. at 170 (concluding that exclusion of expert opinion at certification
stage requires "that the opinion is ... junk science"). In class certification hearings expert testimony is critical to assessing the Rule 23(b) (3) requirement of predominance. See Heather P. Scribner, Rigorous Analysis of the Class CertificationExpert:
The Roles of Daubert and the Defendant's Proof 28 REv. LITIG. 71, 72 (2008) (observing that plaintiffs often have expert witnesses to opine "that the case's material
facts, which would seem to require individualized inquiries from each class member, can instead be proven through a common formula on behalf of the entire
class").
78. See Hydrogen Peroxide, 240 F.R.D. at 171 (opining that "it is of no moment
to .

.

. resolution of a Daubert motion" if defense expert reaches different conclu-

sion than plaintiffs' expert).
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granted this petition.7 9 The core issue on appeal was whether the plaintiffs had satisfied Rule 23(b)'s predominance requirement.8 0
B.

The Third CircuitApplies an Acid Test and Bleaches Clean
the Certification Standard

In Hydrogen Peroxide, the Third Circuit defined the procedure that
lower courts must follow in deciding class certification motions.8 1 First,
the court clarified that plaintiffs must prove factual determinations supporting Rule 23 requirements by a preponderance of the evidence. 82 The
court emphasized that class certification necessitates a "rigorous analysis"
and, therefore, that a mere threshold showing that Rule 23 requirements
are met is insufficient.83 Rejecting the district court's determination that
the plaintiffs' "intention to prove a significant portion of their case
through factual evidence and legal arguments common to all class members" would be sufficient to prove predominance, the court noted that
"actual, not presumed conformance with the Rule 23 requirements [is]
necessary." 84
Second, the Third Circuit held that "the [district] court must resolve
all factual or legal disputes relevant to class certification, even if they overlap with the merits-including disputes touching on the cause of action."8 5 The court attempted to reconcile lower courts' misinterpretations
of the Supreme Court's ruling in Eisen, noting that the decision is "best
understood to preclude only a merits inquiry that is not necessary to determine a Rule 23 requirement."8 6
Third, the Third Circuit held that a district court must "consider all
relevant evidence and arguments," which includes "expert testimony,
whether offered by a party seeking class certification or by a party oppos79. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 309 (3d Cir.
2008) (stating that Third Circuit has jurisdiction over case under Rule 23(f)).
Rule 23(f) states "[a] court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certification." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
80. See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 310 (noting defendants did not contest
that plaintiffs met requirements of Rule 23(a)).
81. See infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text (analyzing Third Circuit's instructions to district courts regarding class certification motions).
82. See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320 (noting preponderance of evidence
standard requires court to "find that the evidence more likely than not established
each fact necessary to meet the requirements of Rule 23").
83. See id. at 318 (stating "a party's assurance ... that it intends or plans to
meet the requirements [of Rule 23] is insufficient").
84. See id. at 321-22 (opining that court should not conduct "tentative" analysis and should "encourage development of a record sufficient for informed analysis" prior to ruling on certification motion).
85. Id. at 307.
86. See id. at 317 (emphasizing that "a contested requirement is not forfeited
in favor of the party seeking certification merely because it is similar to or even
identical to one normally decided by a trier of fact").
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ing it."8 7 The court emphasized that "weighing conflicting expert testimony at certification stage ... may be integral to the rigorous analysis Rule
23 demands."8 8
Finally, the Third Circuit addressed the so-called "Bogosian short-cut"
89
Reiterating that "actual, not prefor antitrust suits alleging price-fixing.
sumed conformance with Rule 23 requirements is essential," the court
held that this presumption of impact conflicts with the 2003 amendments
to Rule 23.90 Although the Third Circuit did not explicitly overrule the
"Bogosian short-cut," the court determined that the presumption is not suf9
ficient to fulfill a plaintiffs burden of proof regarding common impact. '
IV.

IMPACT OF THE "HYDROGEN BOMB" ON THE JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE

The Third Circuit's Hydrogen Peroxide decision is consistent with other
federal circuits that have started to apply a more rigorous standard of re92
The decision is significant because it
view to class certification motions.
defines the contours of a Rule 23 class certification analysis in three important ways. 93 First, the Third Circuit's explicit mandate that district courts
resolve all factual disputes, even those dealing with the merits of the case,
87. Id. at 307.
88. See id. at 323 (citing cases from various other circuits that emphasize importance of resolving expert disputes at class certification stage).
89. See id. at 325-26 (discussing presumption of antitrust impact).
90. See id. at 326 (citation omitted) (noting that 2003 amendments to Rule 23
require "careful, fact-based approach, informed, if necessary, by discovery" which
would not be possible if class-wide impact were presumed merely based on plaintiffs' allegations of price-fixing).
91. See Render & Renaldi, supra note 69 (explaining that the "Third Circuit
did not overturn Bogosian").
92. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41-42 (2d Cir. 2006)
(rejecting earlier opinions and stating court "can no longer continue to advise
district courts that some showing of meeting Rule 23 requirements will suffice and
that findings are required, or that an expert's report will sustain a plaintiffs burden so long as it is not fatally flawed"); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d
672, 678 (7th Cir. 2001) (inviting lower court to "pierce the allegations of the
complaint" and examine obstacles that may block class certification).
93. SeeJames C. Martin & Colin E. Wrabley, Third Circuit ClarifiesKey Aspects of
CertificationProcedure, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 9, 2009, available at http://www.
reedsmith.com/library/search_1ibrary.cfm?FaAreal=CustomWidgets.content-view
1&cit id=24013 (opining "because of its clarification of principles controlling
motions for class certification, [Hydrogen Peroxide] may well turn out to be the most
influential" decision in class certification jurisprudence); Michelle Doolin et al.,
Third Circuit Clarifies the "Rigorous Analysis" Inquiry District Courts are to Conduct in
Deciding Motion for Class Certification, CLIENT ALERTS (Cooley LLP), Feb. 18, 2009,
http://www.cooley.com/58932 (calling opinion "one of the most important decisions in class action litigation in several years"). Although Hydrogen Peroxide is similar to other circuit court opinions that applied more rigorous review, the opinion
is unique in the level of detailed guidance it provides lower courts and its in-depth
analysis of expert testimony at the certification stage. See Richard A. Ripley & Mark
J. Glueck, In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation Bleaches Clean the Class Certification Standard, ANTrRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2009, available at http://www.abanet.
org/antitrust/at-source/09/02/Feb9-Ripley2-26.pdf (distinguishing Third Cir-
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at the certification stage should cause plaintiffs' attorneys to reconsider
the timing of their certification motions.9 4 Second, the Third Circuit's
invitation to district courts to resolve "battles of the experts" invites a new
interplay between a Daubert motion and opposition of certification, and
gives defendants new strategic options when filing a motion to oppose certification.9 5 Finally, in light of the Third Circuit's rejection of the "Bogosian short-cut," plaintiffs must now explore new methods of proving classwide impact under Rule 23(b) in antitrust cases. 96
A.

Merits Inquiry Presents New Barrierfor Plaintiffs

The Hydrogen Peroxidedecision mandated that district courts consider
all factual disputes necessary to determine if the requirements of Rule 23
are met, even if these disputes touch on the merits of the case. 9 7 This
mandate increases the plaintiffs burden of proof for class certification.9 8
With district courts now delving deeper into the pleadings to determine if
Rule 23 requirements are met, attorneys seeking to certify a class should
rethink the appropriate timing of a certification motion. 99 In light of the
"rigorous analysis" given to certification motions, prudent plaintiffs' attorneys will ensure that there is a sufficient factual record to support the Rule
23 requirement of class-wide impact prior to filing a certification motion;
this often will mean that plaintiffs' attorneys should file motions for class
certification only after preliminary discovery, as opposed to the typical
practice of filing a motion for certification early in the litigation.' 0 o Addicuit's opinion from recent opinions dealing with class certification in Seventh, Second, and First Circuits).
94. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (concluding that plaintiffs
may want to wait to file certification motions later in litigation after there is time
for preliminary discovery).
95. See generally David L. Hanselman, Jr. & Jennifer Smulin Diver, Opposing
Class Certification with a One-Two Punch, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 20, 2009, available at http:/
/www.mwe.com/info/pubs/daubert.pdf (discussing impact of Daubert motion at
certification stage).
96. See generally supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (summarizing permitted use of Bogosian presumption in antitrust cases in Third Circuit).
97. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316 (3d Cir.
2008) (noting that "overlap between a class certification requirement and the merits of a claim is no reason to decline to resolve relevant disputes").
98. See id. at 321 (rejecting notion that plaintiffs merely need to show intention to prove elements of Rule 23 and opining that plaintiffs burden is not "lenient one"); see also R. Bruce Allensworth, Andrew C. Glass & David D. Christensen,
Putting the Rigor in Rigorous: The Third Circuit Clarifies Plaintiffs' Burden of Proof in
Seeking Class Certification,NEWSSTAND (K&L Gates LLP), Feb. 13, 2009, http://www.
klgates.com/newsstand/Detail.aspx?publication=5316#_edn1
(stating Hydrogen
Peroxide "heralds a welcomed bolstering of the standard of proof that plaintiffs
must satisfy").
99. See Nussbaum & Radice, supra note 25 (observing that filing motion for
certification early in litigation "now has substantial pitfalls").
100. See Ripley & Glueck, supra note 93 (concluding that plaintiffs should wait
until evidentiary record is "sufficiently robust to support fact finding" of Rule 23
elements to file certification motion). Waiting to file class certification motion

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol55/iss5/2

16

Dudash: Hydrogen Peroxide: The Third Circuit Comes Clean about the Rule 2

2010]

CASEBRIEF

1001

tionally, in light of the deeper inquiry into Rule 23 requirements, defense
attorneys should consider opposing class certification in each case and
should no longer readily stipulate to class certification.101 The impact of
Hydrogen Peroxide is already evident within the Third Circuit, where plaintiffs have sought to withdraw their early filed certification motions, opting
02
instead to wait to re-file the motions after further discovery.

B.

Battle of the Experts Provides Defendants with New Strategies
for Opposing Class Certification

Hydrogen Peroxide's invitation to district courts to weigh competing expert testimony will incentivize both plaintiffs and defendants to use expert
03
Defense attorneys in
testimony to support class certification briefs.
class action lawsuits often file motions to exclude plaintiffs' expert testimony under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.104 After Hydrogen Peroxide, however, a district
court's ruling on a Daubertmotion does not prevent a probing inquiry into
until later is consistent with the 2003 amendments to Rule 23, which changed instructions for the timing of class certification motions to reflect additional time for
discovery. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note to the 2003 amendments ("The requirement that the court determine whether to certify a class 'as
soon as practicable after commencement of an action' is replaced by requiring
determination 'at an early practicable time."').
101. See Yang v. Odom, 392 F.3d 97, 100 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing instance
where defendants stipulated to class certification and district court "rejected the
stipulation" because "parties had failed to make an appropriate showing that the
requirements of Rule 23 had been satisfied"). Although post-Hydrogen Peroxidedefendants are less likely to stipulate to class certification, if defendants feel that
plaintiffs can meet the Rule 23 requirements after discovery, prudent defendants
may still consider stipulating to class certification because the initial discovery for
class certification motions can be costly for both parties. See Mark P. Szpak & Anne
E. Johnson, Class Certification in the United States: the Rise of Rigor Among the Federal
at http://www.
Circuits, CLAss AcrION DEFENSE Q., June 2009, at 49, 53,7 available
4 2 2 8 31
ea47d/Presropesgray.com/files/Publication/973b8d4a-48fd-4688-b 7 c - c d 2 91
f 6 c/Ropes
entation/PublicationAttachment/308f0887-91f2-43dd-8 91-23ce4e
Gray-Article-SzpakAndJohnsonExamineStricterStandardsForClassActionSuits.pdf
(discussing discovery costs pre-class certification and impact on defendants).
102. See Nussbaum & Radice, supranote 25 (discussing Flonase antitrust litigation in which Eastern District of Pennsylvania judge allowed plaintiffs to withdraw
their motion for class certification in light of Hydrogen Peroxide decision).
103. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 313-15 (3d
Cir. 2008) (analyzing and weighing opposing parties' expert testimony on issue of
predominance).
104. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589-95 (1993) (discussing standard for admission of expert testimony in federal courts). In Hydrogen Peroxide, the defendants sought to exclude plaintiffs' expert testimony under Daubert,
but this motion was denied at the district court level and was not challenged on
appeal. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 240 F.R.D. 163, 171 (E.D. Pa.
2007) (discussing requirements for assessing Daubert motion at class certification
stage).
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whether an expert's testimony establishes a Rule 23 requirement. 0 5 The
Third Circuit emphasized that expert opinion "calls for rigorous analysis"
and "is especially important to bear in mind when a party opposing certification offers expert opinion."1 06 Thus, in a case where one party relies on
expert testimony to meet the burden of proving Rule 23 elements, the
other party seeking to oppose class certification can file a Daubert motion

to exclude the expert testimony at the certification stage in conjunction
with a motion to oppose class certification. 107 This enables defendants to
use the Daubert brief to raise technical arguments against expert testimony
that can complement arguments made in the motion to oppose class certi-

fication. 108 Even if a Daubert motion to exclude expert testimony fails at
the certification stage, it may nevertheless expose serious flaws in a plaintiff's expert's methodology and influence the court's decision on
certification.10 9
On the other hand, plaintiffs need to support expert testimony with
greater factual specificity in order to win the battle of the experts against a
defense expert who will likely critique the methods used by the plaintiffs'

experts. 110 Specifically, in antitrust litigation, plaintiffs can no longer rely
on expert testimony that a proposed method will adequately illustrate
class-wide impact; instead, plaintiffs' experts should use factual marketspecific data for the market at issue and apply the proposed method of
analysis to demonstrate class-wide impact.1 '
105. See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 323 (emphasizing that district court's
ruling that expert's testimony meets Daubert requirements does not indicate that
testimony should be "uncritically accepted as establishing a Rule 23 requirement").
106. Id.
107. See Hanselman & Diver, supranote 95 (discussing benefits and drawbacks
of filing Daubert motion in conjunction with motion to oppose class certification).
108. See id. (calling strategy of filing motion to oppose class certification in
conjunction with Daubertmotion to exclude expert testimony "one-two punch" and
noting that even if Daubert motion is denied, argument made in Daubert motion
"could help persuade the court to deny certification").
109. See Rhodes v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 253 F.R.D. 365, 374
(S.D.W.V. 2008) (denying class certification after holding hearing on admissibility
of expert testimony and citing defendant's persuasive arguments and expert testimony as impacting decision to deny class certification).
110. See Nussbaum & Radice, supra note 25 (opining that "greater factual
grounding of expert reports will allow plaintiffs to avoid the critique that theoretical models are insufficient to demonstrate class-wide impact"); Ripley & Glueck,
supra note 93 (observing that "Hydrogen Peroxide places heightened emphasis on
developing the facts by which experts are able to opine about" Rule 23
requirements).
111. See Donald Hawthorne & Margaret Sanderson, Rigorous Analysis of Economic Evidence on Class Certification in Antitrust Cases, 24 ANTITRUST 1, 55, 59 (2009),
available at http://crai.com/uploadedFiles/Publications/Rigorous-Analysis-of-Economic-Evidence-on-Class-Certification-in-Antitrust-Cases.pdPn=7511 (emphasizing
"success of plaintiffs and their experts in convincing a court to certify a class will
depend significantly on the care that plaintiffs have taken to analyze case facts
without relying on unsubstantiated presumptions or easily challenged hypotheses"
and discussing various cases where plaintiffs' experts failed in light of rigorous

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol55/iss5/2

18

Dudash: Hydrogen Peroxide: The Third Circuit Comes Clean about the Rule 2

2010]

CASEBRIEF

C.

1003

Rejection of the 'Bogosian Short-Cut" Forces Plaintiffs
to Explore New Methods

After the Hydrogen Peroxide court explicitly rejected any presumption
in favor of class certification based on the type of action, plaintiffs' attorneys can no longer rely on courts' tendency to readily certify classes in
antitrust and securities fraud litigations. 112 Thus, plaintiffs' attorneys
need to bolster the substance of evidence supporting class certification to
ensure that without any presumptions, there is adequate proof of each
Rule 23 requirement.11 3 In the antitrust context, this requires that plaintiffs provide more than allegations of price-fixing to prove common impact; rather, such allegations must be supported through statistical analysis
from an expert witness. 114 Although plaintiffs can still invoke Bogosian to
illustrate that price-fixing typically impacts all purchasers, bare claims of
price-fixing-without expert testimony offering supporting analysis of the
specific product market at issue-will lead to denial of class certification.1 15 Defendants can benefit from the court's new rigorous review by
presenting expert testimony to specifically undermine and disprove the
1 16
common impact of price-fixing allegations.
V.

CLAss AcrION CERTIFICATION REDEFINED

The Third Circuit's decision has significantly impacted district courts'
1 17
District courts are now giving seanalysis of class certification motions.
review by district courts); see also James F. Nieberding & Robin A. Cantor, Price
Dispersion and Class Certification in Antitrust Cases: An Economic Analysis, 14 J. L.
ECON. 2, 61, 62 (2007) (observing that "[o]ften the determination of whether [the
plaintiffs expert] can truly deliver on a methodology to demonstrate antitrust impact through class-wide proof is the determining factor in a court's predominance
decision"); Ripley & Glueck, supra note 93 (discussing new challenges facing plaintiffs' experts at class certification stage).
112. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 322 (3d Cir.
2008) (concluding court should not "relax its certification analysis, or presume a
requirement of certification is met" simply because court wants to encourage pnvate enforcement of antitrust or securities laws).
113. See Render & Renaldi, supra note 69 (stating that new analysis of Rule 23
will force "plaintiffs to present more than mere 'conclusions' or ask the court to
make 'assumptions' in the face of deficient evidence").
114. See In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d 145, 153 (3d Cir. 2002)
(emphasizing that Bogosian presumption of impact was properly invoked, but was
also supported by expert testimony supplemented with "charts, studies, and articles
from leading trade publications" as well as "advanced econometric models").
115. See Weisfeld v. Sun Chem. Corp., 210 F.R.D. 136, 143 (D. N.J. 2002) (denying class certification because plaintiffs relied on Bogoasian and on "naked conclusions" of class-wide impact and failed to offer anything to "bolster .
conclusions" contrary to support provided in Linerboard).
116. See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 313-14 (discussing defense expert's
claims that plaintiffs would not be able to prove impact through common
evidence).
117. See In re Plastics Additives Antitrust Litig., Nos. 07-2159, 07-2418, 2009
U.S. App. LEXIS 2177 (3d Cir. Jan. 27, 2009) (remanding case for further pro-
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rious scrutiny to competing expert opinions at the class certification
stage. 18 Other jurisdictions have adopted portions of the Third Circuit's
approach in Hydrogen Peroxide.' 19
Commentators opine that the Third Circuit's stringent review standards for class certification are likely "ripe for export to other circuits."' 20
Hydrogen Peroxide is in line with recent Supreme Court jurisprudence that
encourages lower courts to conduct a thorough examination of claims
early in the litigation process.' 2 ' Additionally, the Third Circuit's ruling
brings the circuit in line with an increasing number of other circuits that
are engaging in a more stringent review of claims at the certification
stage.1 2 2 The Hydrogen Peroxide decision will also likely influence other circuits because ChiefJudge Anthony Scirica, who was involved with the reviceedings consistent with Hydrogen Peroxide opinion after district court refused to
weigh competing expert testimony at class certification stage).
118. See McDonough v. Toys R Us, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 461, 479 (E.D. Pa.
2009) (weighing each party's expert testimony and concluding that plaintiffs' expert's damages calculations were "most persuasive" and would give "reasonable estimate of damages"); Lewis v. Ford Motor Co., CA No. 09-164, 2009 WL 2355744 at
*4 (W.D. Pa. July 30, 2009) (determining that in light of Hydrogen Peroxide, court
cannot not disregard defense expert who opined that class proposed included car
owners whose cars did not have allegedly defective suspension system at issue in
this potential products liability class action).
119. See, e.g., Reed v. Advocate Health Care, No. 06 C 3337, 2009 WL 3146999
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2009) (citing Hydrogen Peroxide for premise that expert
testimony on impact must be examined in antitrust cases at certification stage); In
re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 257 F.R.D. 260, 272 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (adopting
preponderance of evidence standard for plaintiffs' burden of proof in securities
fraud class action case); Jackson v. Unocal Corp., No. 09CA0610, 2009 WL 2182603
at *5 (Colo. Ct. App. July 23, 2009) (engaging in battle of experts at certification
stage).
120. See Cindy D. Hanson & John P. Jett, Good News For Opponents of Class
Certification, LAw 360, Aug. 25, 2009, http://www.law360.com/company-articles/
4248/17?startpage=11 (discussing importance of Hydrogen Peroxide opinion within
Third Circuit and beyond); see also Linda Mullenix, Hydrogen Bomb, RECORDER, Feb.
11, 2009, availableat http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=120242808
8834&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 (opining that Hydrogen Peroxide opinion is "likely to
have a tremendous impact on all class litigation"); Nicholas, supra note 9 (discussing potential influence of decision and opining it "will apply in TICO, ERISA and
Consumer Fraud Act cases"); Martin & Wrabley, supra note 93 (stating "it is unlikely that the influence of Hydrogen Peroxidewill stop at the Third Circuit's boundaries" and concluding "parties moving and opposing class certification would do
well to keep the Third Circuit's analytical framework in mind").
121. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940-41 (2009) (stating "mere [allegations pleaded as] conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth"); Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545-46 (2007) (discussing costs of antitrust discovery and cautioning courts to thoroughly examine factual allegations of
pleadings early in litigation).
122. See In re Initial Pub. Offerings Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2006)
(inviting district courts to examine Rule 23 requirements at certification stage even
if intertwined with merits of case); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672,
675-76 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that district court must resolve factual and legal
disputes at certification stage and emphasizing that court does not need to take
complaint's allegations as truth).
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sion of Rule 23, wrote the opinion and provided a pragmatic and detailed
explanation of class certification requirements.1 2 3 Ultimately, for practitioners on both sides of class action lawsuits in federal and state courts
across the country, developing a complete factual record at the certification stage and utilizing expert testimony is a prudent plan of attack because courts seem increasingly likely to apply a more rigorous review to
class action certification motions.124
Amy Dudash

123. See Mullenix, supra note 120 (noting significance of opinion in part due
to ChiefJudge Scirica's role as chairman of Standing Committee on Rules of Prac-

tice and Procedure, on Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, and chairman ofJudicial Conference Working Group on Mass Torts).
124. See generallyJefferyJ. Greenbaum & Stuart M. Feinblatt, Hydrogen Peroxide: The Third Circuit's "Acid Test" for Class Certification, METROPOLITAN CORP.
CouNs., Mar. 31, 2009, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.
php?artType-view&artMonth=April&artYear=2009&EntryNo=9576
(assessing
"number of practical consequences" Hydrogen Peroxide decision has on certification
standards within Third Circuit).
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